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Using a large sample of 5,365 European firms, we document the driving factors of 
debt-equity choices. Adjustments to a target debt level play a modest role except when debt 
exceeds an upper barrier, a result that underlines the importance of debt capacity. Preference 
for internal financing, leverage deficit prior to equity issues, as well as a high level of slack of 
firms seeking to reduce equity constitute further evidence in favor of pecking order models. It 
is also found that managers try to time the market by issuing shares when returns are high, but 
that there is a link between financing and investment activities as predicted by agency models. 
 
Keywords: dynamic capital structure, debt-equity choice, tradeoff models, pecking order 
models. 
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Executive summary 
 
Debt equity choices are a main concern for financial executives, but capital structure is 
still puzzling academics. At first glance, the existence of a target debt ratio is an appealing 
concept to understand capital structure. If there are pros and cons associated with debt 
finance, financial policy consists in finding the optimal leverage ratio that equalizes marginal 
costs and benefits. Debt tax shield, financial distress and agency conflicts are significant 
constituents of these costs and benefits. Such a basic trade off view has been challenged both 
on theoretical and empirical grounds. 
Focusing on information asymmetries, pecking order models do not result in an 
optimal debt ratio due to the varying impact of asymmetric information on the value of 
internal and external finance. As a result, firms should prefer internal financing over external 
financing and debt issues over equity issues. 
Financial decisions are dynamic in nature and capital structure models have to account 
for this. Dynamic patterns have been included through the speed of adjustment in trade off 
models and non constant levels of asymmetric information in pecking order models. Such 
refinements increase the complexity of the empirical test design. For example, dynamic panel 
data analysis allows the speed of adjustment to be estimated but implies that a target leverage 
ratio exists.  
Debt equity choice tests do not require that a priori assumptions concerning financial 
policy be made and allow the dominant forces acting on capital structure to be identified. This 
is because such choices encompass both financing and payout activities, and because rational 
managers will only modify capital structure when benefits exceed costs. Past debt equity 
choice studies highlight the economic role played by important pieces of the puzzle: 
adjustment to a target leverage ratio -the cornerstone of dynamic trade off models-, operating 
performance and market performance. 
We document debt equity choice using a large sample of more than 5,000 European 
firms over the period 1989-2000. We test pecking order and trade off models through time-
series analysis of leverage ratios around these events and through cross-sectional analysis of 
firm specific determinants of these choices. We provide evidence that neither of these models 
in their most commonly accepted forms offer an acceptable description of the real world. We 
conclude that the financing process is complex and dynamic. 
We document significant deviations from the target leverage ratio. This suggests that 
the speed of adjustment (if any) is slow. In addition we show that the leverage ratio has only   2
an upper barrier beyond which it has to be actively reduced in particular through debt 
reduction. This behavior of European firms is consistent with pecking order models that 
include debt capacity concerns. Evidence of a lower leverage boundary is inconclusive. This 
result contradicts predictions of dynamic tradeoff models, which are models with two barriers. 
We find that operating performance affects debt equity choices. There is a strong 
preference for internal over external financing, in particular for internal over debt financing 
even though there are second order benefits of debt financing for profitable firms. Firms that 
reduce their equity, through share repurchases or significant increases in dividends, are not 
concerned with debt capacity problems. They may even react to an excess in debt capacity, a 
behavior in line with pecking order models. 
Finally, we show that market performance affects debt equity choices in two ways. 
First managers try to take advantage of favorable market fluctuations, i.e. they issue equity 
when stock prices are low and repurchase shares when stock prices are high. Even when this 
timing effect is controlled for we find a significant impact of market performance on debt 
equity choices. Further tests show that these effects are rooted in agency conflicts and 
interactions between the financing and investment activities. When companies have profitable 
investment projects, a convergence of interests between managers and shareholders favors 
either equity financing or the quest for financial flexibility through leverage reduction. In the 
opposite case, debt financing and equity reduction are used for their disciplinary power on 
managers. 
   3
Further evidence on debt-equity choice 
 
1  Introduction 
Since the seminal article by Modigliani and Miller (1958) showing that any change in 
capital structure is neutral with respect to the value of the firm, the topic of capital structure 
has been the focus of many publications. These studies investigate optimal financial policies 
by adding various imperfections to the standard framework of Modigliani and Miller. Two 
types of models currently prevail in the literature: (1) tradeoff models that define optimal 
financial policy as an adjustment process towards a target debt ratio and (2) pecking order 
models in which optimal financial policy depends on the ability to generate internal financing 
and on market conditions. In the latter models, the target debt ratio is secondary. 
The existence of a target debt ratio is an appealing concept. If markets are imperfect, 
there must be pros and cons associated with using debt. Financial policy therefore consists in 
an optimization process under constraints. Firms increase (decrease) their debt ratio when it is 
lower (higher) than the optimal leverage ratio. Traditional tradeoff models balance tax 
benefits of debt (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Miller and Scholes, 1978) against financial 
distress costs (Stiglitz, 1972; Titman, 1984). Positive agency models also involve a tradeoff 
between reducing agency costs of managerial discretion (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 
1986) and agency costs of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Stulz 1990). 
Dynamic tradeoff models (Fischer et al., 1989; Leland, 1998; Ju et al., 2002) allow deviations 
between the observed leverage ratio and the target ratio. Thus, optimal financial policy 
consists in making adjustments when costs caused by disequilibrium (costs of deviation) 
exceed transaction costs (adjustment costs). 
An analysis of information asymmetries between managers and external investors 
leads Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) to develop the pecking order model. 
Adverse selection risk premia required by external investors create biases in investment 
choice. If existing shareholders are passive, managers can cut informational costs by 
modifying the financial policy. They will favor financing sources that are least subject to 
information asymmetries. More specifically, firms prefer internal financing over external   4
financing, and debt issues
1 over equity issues. Lucas and Mc Donald (1990) formally 
integrate equity issues into a pecking order framework. Firms issue stocks during windows of 
opportunities arising when the release of valuable information has corrected previous 
undervaluation or when positive Net Present Value (NPV) projects become available during 
periods of overvaluation. Another feature of pecking order models is that managers seek to 
accumulate financial slack. This excess cash provides flexibility and therefore allows firms to 
avoid information asymmetry costs. Slack also reduces financial distress costs which occur at 
high debt levels. Because of such costs, there exists a maximum debt ratio, the debt capacity 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Empirically, much emphasis has been placed on analyzing the determinants of the 
(observed) leverage ratio. Titman and Wessels (1988) contribute to formulating and testing 
assumptions as identified by financial theory. Rajan and Zingales (1995) for the G7 countries 
and Booth et al. (2001) for ten developing countries test the theoretical and empirical lessons 
learnt from U.S. studies. Results are found to be robust with respect to economic cycles and 
institutional environments. The positive impact of firm size and of the tangibility ratio on 
observed debt ratios is interpreted as being favorable to the tradeoff models, whereas the 
negative impact of profitability as being favorable to pecking order models. Growth options 
and asset misvaluation issues lead to mixed interpretations of the positive impact of the 
market-to-book ratio (MTB). Using estimators suited to dynamic panel data analysis, Miguel 
and Pindado (2001) find that Spanish firms rapidly adjust to their target leverage ratio. In 
contrast, adjustment has been found to be slow for Swiss companies (Gaud et al., 2004). 
Overall, no dominant model emerges from these studies. 
An empirical alternative is to study debt-equity choice. Motivations that govern 
corporate financial policy are analyzed by focusing on significant external changes of capital 
structure. For example, Marsh (1982) and MacKie-Mason (1990) find a higher probability of 
issuing equity rather than debt when the observed debt ratio exceeds the target debt ratio. 
Market performance is also found to positively impact this probability. 
Financial policy is dynamic in nature and therefore cross-sectional regression analyses 
of the determinants of leverage ratio have limited relevance as they are static. In a dynamic 
framework, observed leverage ratios are affected both by events that cause deviations from 
the target leverage ratio and by those that alter the target. Dynamic panel data estimators 
                                                 
1 Unless an explicit distinction is made, ‘issues (reductions) of debt’ comprises issues (repayments) of bonds and 
bank loans (repayments of loans).   5
enable endogenous target leverage ratios and the adjustment speed within the sample to be 
estimated. These econometric models, however, make the a priori assumption that a target 
leverage ratio exists. Such an assumption is not relevant in a pecking order framework
2. In 
contrast, debt-equity choice tests do not require that a priori assumptions concerning financial 
policy be made. As these tests focus on changes, they are dynamic in nature. They are also 
sufficiently flexible to be run with unbalanced panel data. Finally, debt-equity choices allow 
the dominant forces acting on capital structure to be identified. This is because such choices 
encompass both financing and payout activities, and because rational managers will only 
modify capital structure when benefits exceed costs. 
Several studies on debt-equity choice have appeared recently, but they all focus on 
samples of U.S. firms (Jung et al., 1996; Hovakimian et al., 2001; Hovakimian, 2004; 
Hovakimian et al., 2004). These studies highlight the economic role played by three important 
pieces of the puzzle: Adjustment to a target leverage ratio, operating performance, and market 
performance. As compared with prior studies, these analyses are based on larger samples and 
consider a wider array of events that are better defined. Tests of the adjustment to a target 
leverage ratio are crucial as adjustment is the cornerstone of dynamic tradeoff models. Also, 
an examination of the impact of performance should highlight whether it is a significant 
determinant of the target leverage ratio and/or of deviations from this target. This test may 
also lead to the conclusion that the impact of performance on debt-equity choice stems from 
other factors than the adjustment to the target leverage ratio as implied by pecking order 
models. 
This article claims a number of contributions to this literature. First, we test whether 
capital structure models and U.S. evidence are portable to the European market. To date, there 
is very limited quantitative empirical evidence on non-U.S. debt-equity choice
3. For this 
purpose, we construct a sample of 5,365 European firms for the period 1989-2000. Even 
though the European market is in a consolidation phase, there still exists considerable 
institutional and cultural diversity. Thus, strong economic forces would be at work if results 
were found to be significant in spite of these institutional differences. This article also 
contributes to the literature by incorporating significant dividend increases in the range of 
                                                 
2 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) point to the poor performance of a dynamic tradeoff model compared to a 
simple pecking order model to explain changes in debt ratios over time. 
3 Bancel and Mittoo (2002) analyze capital structure choice of European firms, but they conduct a survey rather 
than a quantitative study.   6
payout choices. We maintain that there is no reason to exclude dividend increases while 
including other forms of payouts such as debt reductions or share repurchases
4. Finally, we 
introduce linear restriction tests on MTB levels to gain better insight on the issue of market 
performance and, more specifically, of investment prospects. Using interacted variables, we 
test the agency hypothesis by examining changes in sign on MTB for firms having different 
investment prospects. 
Our results indicate that neither a simple pecking order model nor a simple tradeoff 
model is sufficient in understanding financial policy. We conclude that the financing process 
is complex and dynamic. In terms of debt ratios, we find that firms only constrain themselves 
to an upper barrier. As implied by the role of debt capacity in pecking order models, firms 
refuse to exceed a maximum debt level and prefer to repay debt rather than exceeding this 
limit. Evidence of a lower leverage boundary is inconclusive. This result contradicts 
predictions of dynamic tradeoff models, which are models with two barriers. 
Operating and market performance affect debt-equity choice. Firms prefer internal 
financing to debt issues, although the latter provide second order benefits. In contrast to 
Hovakimian et al. (2004), we do not find that unprofitable firms seeking outside financing 
prefer to issue equity. But we find that profitable firms do try to reduce their equity. As 
profitable firms do not have debt capacity concerns, they may react to the excessive costs of 
slack as suggested by pecking order models. Two distinct effects are embedded in market 
performance results. Empirical evidence shows that managers are trying to time the market, 
but also that financing and investment activities interact. In particular, debt does not represent 
a suitable form of financing for firms with profitable investment projects. Instead, such firms 
issue equity or, if they can, repay debt to maintain financial flexibility. In contrast, debt 
disciplines managers when there is a lack of profitable projects. Firms with no positive NPV 
projects prefer debt issues and reductions of equity, either by share repurchases or by 
dividend increases. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a review 
of the literature on the determinants of debt-equity choice. The method and hypotheses are 
discussed in section 3, while our data are presented in section 4. Results are discussed in 
                                                 
4 For the U.S. market, Grullon and Michaelly (2002) indicate a propensity to substitute dividend payments by 
share repurchases. Significant share repurchases are scarce in our sample because of restrictive legislation in 
continental Europe during the period under review.   7
section 5, while section 6 deals with their sensitivity. Finally, section 7 contains some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2  Literature review 
In this section, we provide a review of the main determinants of debt-equity choice: 
Target debt ratio, observed debt ratio, operating performance, and market performance. 
2.1  Target debt ratio and observed debt ratio 
Two cases suggest a capital structure transaction under dynamic tradeoff models. First, 
a change in the target level and thus of its limits puts the effective leverage outside the new 
limits. Second, the deviation from the target suffers an increase such that the costs of 
deviation exceed those of adjustment. In both cases, adjustment creates value and should be 
priced by the market. Event studies on debt-equity choice, however, show abnormal positive 
(negative) price reactions to increases (decreases) in the leverage ratio (Masulis, 1980; Jung et 
al., 1996). These unilateral reactions underline the importance of agency and informational 
issues. 
The target debt ratio is of secondary importance in pecking order models. 
Nevertheless, effective leverage affects choice of capital structure due to debt capacity. 
Highly levered firms can either choose to issue equity or to forgo investment rather than issue 
debt. Operating at levels close to debt capacity is expensive because of high bankruptcy costs 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
In debt-equity choice studies, tests of adjustment to a target leverage ratio yield mixed 
results. Under tradeoff models, the choice is made in order to reduce positive or negative 
deviations from the target leverage. Marsh (1982), Jalilvand and Harris (1984) and MacKie-
Mason (1990) show a higher probability of issuing equity rather than debt when observed 
leverage exceeds target leverage. In Hovakimian et al. (2001), the difference between 
observed and target leverage does not have any power in explaining the amounts issued, but 
does affect the amounts repurchased. After cleaning the sample of overlapping transactions, 
Hovakimian (2004) finds that this difference neither affects share issues, nor share 
repurchases and debt issues. His results only confirm the adjustment hypothesis for debt 
reductions. Note that these studies use a variety of procedures to proxy for the target. Initially, 
historical statistics of leverage ratios were used. Hovakimian et al. (2001) substitute these 
broad and static proxies with regression-based estimates. Hovakimian (2004), however, does   8
not observe any change in his results whether he uses regression-based estimates or industry 
levels statistics. 
 
2.2  Operating performance 
Internal financing and part of the slack are rooted in operating performance. Under 
pecking order models, operating performance generates cheap financing that is preferable to 
debt. High and stable operating performance reduces the probability of bankruptcy and 
underinvestment, increases the probability of overinvestment and enables to benefit from debt 
tax shields. Operating performance thus has a positive impact on the leverage ratio in tradeoff 
models. High (low) profitability is a source of passive and negative (positive) deviation in 
dynamic tradeoff models. 
Empirically, straightforward regressions of the leverage ratio on a set of potential 
determinants show a negative impact of profitability on leverage (Titman and Wessel, 1988; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001). These regression findings, however, do not 
allow to discriminate between dynamic tradeoff and pecking order models. When firms are 
likely to be close to their target, profitability is found to have no impact on observed leverage 
(Hovakimian et al., 2004). With dynamic estimates, the sign of the profitability variable 
changes when it is lagged (Gaud et al., 2004). These results are in line with dynamic tradeoff 
models. 
Studies of debt-equity choice sharpen this conclusion. Hovakimian et al. (2001) and 
Hovakimian et al. (2004) show that profitability increases the probability of choosing the 
external transaction leading to the highest level of leverage. Hovakimian (2004) does not 
observe this effect for issues. Hovakimian et al. (2004) use simultaneous issues of debt and 
equity to test the presence of specific impacts on a particular type of issue. Profitability 
specifically reduces the probability of equity issues, but has no impact on debt issues. They 
conclude, on the one hand, that unprofitable firms are likely to positively deviate from their 
target and will therefore issue equity rather than debt. On the other hand, profitable firms do 
not offset their negative deviation as they prefer internal financing, which is available. 
 
2.3  Market performance 
Investment prospects and misvaluation of assets are two distinct driving forces on 
capital structure policy that can be proxied by market performance. Conflicts of interests   9
between stakeholders prompt firms with positive NPV projects to prefer equity issues. 
Agency costs of debt (Myers, 1977; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) increase in line with the ratio 
of investment projects over assets in place, while profitable projects reduce agency costs of 
managerial discretion (Jung et al., 1996). When there is a lack of positive NPV projects, the 
convergence between the managerial objective to finance growth by equity issues and the 
criterion of shareholder value maximization vanishes. The cash that remains once all 
profitable projects have been undertaken gives rise to the free cash flow issue (Jensen, 1986). 
In this context, managers prefer to repay debt, unlike shareholders. When managers reduce 
the leverage ratio against the interests of shareholders, however, they also increase the 
probability of a hostile takeover. Managers might therefore constrain themselves to issue debt 
(Zweibel, 1996) or to increase equity payouts. As dividend cuts are extremely costly (Bernatzi 
et al., 1997), dividends are ‘sticky’. Dividend increases are therefore a stronger commitment 
to distribute future cash flows than are share repurchases.  
Jung et al. (1996) note that agency concerns do not exclude adverse selection problems 
on risky securities. They find that equity issues are a worse event for firms lacking valuable 
investment projects than for firms with positive NPV projects. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) 
find that the positive (negative) reaction to an increase (decrease) in dividends is stronger for 
firms subject to overinvestment (i.e. when the Tobin’s Q ratio is less than 1). 
The effect of market performance on capital structure may also derive from the 
managers’ belief that securities are mispriced by the market, which may lead to implement 
market timing strategies. Slow assimilation of information, segmentation of markets, various 
degrees of information asymmetry across firms or time periods are some possible 
explanations for mispricing. Around 59% of European managers surveyed by Bancel and 
Mittoo (2002) recognize that issuing shares after a rise in stock price is important or very 
important. Studies of long-term performance (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Speiss and Affleck-
Graves, 1995; Ikenberry et al., 1995) tend to conclude that market timing is a successful 
strategy on average as returns are abnormally low (high) after equity issues (repurchases). 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) show that equity issues are preceded by a surge in stock price and 
that these transactions have lasting consequences on the leverage ratios. They suggest that 
observed debt ratios can be explained by successive market timing attempts by managers who 
are not concerned about offsetting the resulting impacts on debt levels. Korajczyk and Levy 
(2003) show that financially unconstrained firms are able to deviate from their target leverage 
ratio to take advantage of favorable market conditions. Introducing regression analysis to 
identify determinants of the choice between equity issues and simultaneous debt and equity   10
issues, Hovakimian et al. (2004) control for market timing. They observe that the impact of 
MTB on leverage remains negative, which leads them to favor the tradeoff hypothesis. As 
return loses it significance when market timing is possible whatever the capital structure 
choice, they also conclude that managers attempt to time the market. 
 
3  Method 
Before a detailed discussion of method and hypotheses, it is necessary to define debt-
equity choices. 
3.1  Types of events 
Studies of debt-equity choice focus on significant financing and payout transactions. 
Hovakimian (2004) shows that some transactions have specific determinants and therefore a 
clear definition of event types is necessary. With one exception, we use the traditional 5% 
cut-off criterion of book value of assets at the beginning of the year to identify debt-equity 
choices
5. For dividends, we use a 7% cut-off because they are ‘sticky’ and because we want to 
identify significant dividend increases. In addition, a minimum of two years of data 
surrounding an event is required. We use consolidated financial statements which make it 
possible to analyze private and public external financing. Such data are particularly well 
suited for the European market where bank financing and private equity is likely to play an 
important role. 
There are five basic transactions: Two pure financing transactions – equity issues and 
debt issues – and three pure payout transactions – share repurchases, dividend increases and 
debt reductions. Other transactions simultaneously affect the amount of debt and equity. 
These include (1) simultaneous debt and share issues, (2) simultaneous debt reductions and 
share repurchases, and (3) simultaneous dividend increases and debt reductions. These events 
are either pure financing or pure payout transactions
6. We consider not operating as a choice 
                                                 
5 Changes in equity capital are defined, in Thomson items, based on the cash flow statement as 
[tf.SaleOfComAndPfdStkCFStmt - tf.PurchOfComAndPfdStkCFStmt - tf.CashDividendsCFStmt], whereas 
changes in debts are defined, based on the balance sheet, as the difference over two periods between 
[tf.STDebtAndCurPortLTDebt + tf.TotalLTDebt]. 
6 In this paper, we do not deal with mixed debt-equity choices such as equity issues and debt reductions or debt 
issues and share repurchases. We only seek to observe specific effects on equity and debt.   11
and report a ‘No transactions’ event that includes firms that have not been active in capital 
markets for two consecutive years. 
 
3.2  Event studies 
Time-series analysis of changes in the leverage ratio around the date of a debt-equity 
choice allows to test the main assumption of dynamic tradeoff models, i.e. adjustment to a 
target. For each type of transaction and on a long-term basis, such analysis focuses on major 
changes in the leverage ratio and its target. Our method is similar to that used in Lie (2001), 
Grullon et al. (2002), and Hovakimian (2004). As we use book data, time periods are annual. 
In addition to mean values, median values are also used in this type of study because of 
possible asymmetry in financial data. We study changes in leverage ratios and deviations 
from the target over a window of seven years. Variations for three sub-periods [-3, -1], [-1, 1] 
and [-1, 3] are also presented. Ranking tests for median values and Student tests for mean 
values are reported to assess the significance of changes in leverage and target deviations. 
If firms adjust toward a target leverage ratio, then equity issues and debt reductions are 
a response to excessive positive deviations from the target. In contrast, debt issues, dividend 
increases and share repurchases are responses to out-of-the-range negative deviations. With 
equity issues, for example, the positive deviation of the observed leverage ratio from its target 
should be at a maximum before the issue. Equity issuers should also reduce the leverage ratio 
so that it durably lies within the limits. Changes in the observed leverage ratio also provide 
information on the adjustment mechanism. If firms issue equity to respond to excessive 
positive deviations from the target, the ex ante leverage ratios should be greater than the ex 
post levels. 
 
3.3  LOGIT regressions 
We use LOGIT regressions to test the determinants of debt-equity choices in a 
multivariate setting. Such regressions allow a cross-sectional test of the explanatory power of 
our variables on the probability of debt-equity choices. The estimated model has the following 
general form: 
 







1 y P +
+
= =             (1) 
 
with    ( ) 1 y P it =   :  Probability that firm i operates externally in year t  
  rather than chooses an alternative transaction 
type. 
      it Χ     :  Vector of explanatory variables. 
      it ε     :  Stochastic error term. 
 
If dynamic tradeoff models were to hold, then firms should decide to interact with 
capital markets to reduce excessive over (under) leverage. As long as deviation costs from the 
target are less than adjustment costs, there is no sound reason to actively alter the capital 
structure. Consequently, the pre-transaction observed leverage ratio should increase 
(decrease) the probability of choosing a transaction that reduces (increases) the leverage ratio. 
On the contrary, the target leverage ratio should reduce (increase) this probability. Firms that 
do not interact with financial markets do stay within their limits; therefore the above 
mentioned behaviors should be observed when firms choose between an external transaction 
and no transaction at all. In all other cases, no conclusion can be reached regarding adjustment 
as a dominant force. Indeed, in the regressions of choice between different types of external 
transactions, firms have already chosen either to payout or to finance part of their assets. The 
decision to carry out a transaction may be mainly motivated by other factors such as financing 
needs or a market opportunity, even though the observed signs on adjustment variables are as 
expected. We can thus only conclude that firms minimize deviations from targets from these 
regressions pertaining to external choice
7. 
Tradeoff models predict that high profitability should lead to the selection of 
transactions that increase debt ratios. Profitability should therefore positively (negatively) 
impact on the probability of either issuing debt or repurchasing shares or that of increasing 
dividends (the probability of issuing equity or that of reducing debt), as opposed to not 
carrying out an external transaction. Profitability should also increase the probability of 
issuing debt rather than equity, and decrease that of reducing debt rather than either 
                                                 
7 Hovakimian (2004) refers to this weak hypothesis concerning the role of target ratios as the debt-equity choice 
hypothesis.   13
repurchasing shares or increasing dividends. For profitable firms, we would expect a specific 
positive effect of profitability on the probability of debt issuance as it enables more tax shield, 
has limited effect on the probability of bankruptcy and also corrects mechanical negative 
deviation from the target leverage. In contrast, we do not expect a specific negative impact of 
profitability on equity issues. If unprofitable firms in search of external financing use the 
equity channel, they act in the interests of creditors and managers, but not in that of 
shareholders. 
Under pecking order models, firms prefer internal financing as long as information 
asymmetry remains the main source of cost. To assess this preference, we introduce in our 
regressions a variable to proxy for existing slack. External financing is not necessary if slack 
is sufficient to cover financing needs. Consequently, slack should have a negative impact on 
the probability of choosing external financing. As pecking order models always emphasize 
preference for internal financing over debt financing, the specific impact of existing slack on 
debt issues should be negative once the decision to obtain external financing has been made. 
In contrast, one might observe a specific positive effect of existing slack on equity issuance as 
available cash gives an option to delay equity issues until they become a cheap source of 
financing. 
Limited empirical evidence is available on the specific impact of operating 
performance on debt or equity payouts. As tradeoff and agency models predict a positive 
effect of operating performance on the debt ratio, profitable firms should prefer equity 
reductions to debt reductions. Under pecking order models, profitable firms aim to stockpile 
debt capacity and slack. At high debt levels, firms should therefore prefer debt reductions 
over either ‘No transactions’ or equity reductions. The latter should be avoided when debt 
capacity is a concern or when slack is not too costly. Determinants of slack capacity are not 
well identified. When information is asymmetric, Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999) argue 
that firms exceeding this maximum level prefer to repurchase debt rather than equity due to 
the positive price effect on stocks. 
Concerning market performance, traditional regressions do not discriminate between 
the agency and the market timing hypotheses. For example, both hypotheses predict a positive 
impact of market performance on the probability of issuing equity versus debt or versus ‘No 
transactions’. Firms with profitable investment projects avoid debt financing under an agency 
framework, while market timing suggests that abnormal positive returns lead to the issuing of 
stocks. To discriminate between the two hypotheses, Hovakimian et al. (2004) introduce 
simultaneous debt and equity issues in their set of debt-equity choices. If managers are faced   14
with the decision between issuing simultaneously debt and equity or only equity, they can try 
to time the market in both cases. As a result, a negative effect of market performance can be 
unequivocally attributed to the investment prospect (agency) hypothesis. Furthermore, this 
hypothesis implies that the quality of investment projects affects financing choices. The 
disciplinary role of debt should be of greater value to firms with mediocre investment 
opportunities, while convergence of interests between managers and shareholders as well as 
agency costs of debt should enhance the value of equity issues for firms with profitable 
projects. We introduce an interacted variable between the MTB ratio and a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for firms with a MTB less than 1 to test changes in sign between these two types of 
firms. 
 
4  Data 
The sample is obtained from the Thomson Financial
® database. It includes listed 
companies in member countries of the European Union (EU) and the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA)
8. Data have been deflated and have been converted to constant Euros 
using 2000 as base year
9. Financial institutions and companies whose total book value does 
not exceed €5 million are excluded from the sample. After trimming
10, our sample comprises 
20,661 firm-year observations for 5,365 firms over the 1989-2000 period. Table 1 contains 
descriptive statistics for our main variables. 
The leverage ratio (DTAM) is proxied by the ratio of total financial debt over total 
market value of assets
11. To proxy for the target leverage ratio (TDTAM), we use yearly 
                                                 
8 In total, firms from 17 different countries are represented: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, 
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, Sweden 
and Switzerland. 
9 For firms whose accounts are in non euro-zone currencies, 01.01.2001 is used as the conversion base date. 
10 In order to minimize the impact of outliers, the sample is trimmed applying a method similar to that in Kremp 
et al. (1999). Observations outside the interval defined by the third quartile plus five times the interquartile range 
and the first quartile less five times the interquartile range for return, profitability, interest coverage ratio, net 
margin ratio and net cash-flow margin ratio are excluded. The ratio of depreciation and amortization to total 
assets is trimmed upward only. 
11 (tf.STDebtAndCurPortLTDebt + tf.TotalLTDebt) / (tf.TotalLiabilities + tf.YrEndMarketCap).   15
industry leverage, where industry is identified using the three-digit SIC codes. Hovakimian 
(2004) finds that the same conclusions can be drawn whether industry leverages or 
regression-based targets are used
12. Firms that reduce debt are highly levered prior to the 
transaction, which suggests that beyond a given leverage ratio, firms seek to reduce debt. 
Such firms have very high leverage ratios (27.3% mean value and 24.6% median value), 
whether they are compared to their target ratio (19.2% and 15.6%) or to firms with ‘No 
transactions’ (13.8% and 10.0%). In contrast, firms that reduce equity have very low debt 
levels. The median leverage ratio is 5.5% for share repurchases and 0.3% for dividend 
increases, compared to industry levels of 12.4% and 10.8%, respectively. For debt issuers, the 
differential between observed and industry leverage is also negative, but much less significant 
(14.4% against 16.1% in median values). It is more surprising to observe that equity issuers 
have lower leverage ratios than their peers (11.8% against 14.0% in median values). As a 
result, issues widen existing differentials. Observed differentials before payouts are 
substantial. Under dynamic tradeoff models, such significant deviations from targets and our 
observation that equity issuers are underlevered firms imply large optimal financing areas and 
thus weak adjustment pressures. Substantial negative differentials between the observed 
leverage for firms with ‘No transactions’ (10.0% median value) and the target ratio (14.5% 
median value) also support this point. 
We use two variables to measure operating performance. Profitability before tax, 
interest and depreciation (ROA
13) is measured over the year of the transaction and the 
preceding year. This variable is designed to proxy a firms’ ability to generate cash flow. The 
second variable is the mean ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets (CASH
14) over 
the year of the transaction and the preceding year. This variable is designed to proxy for 
accumulation of existing slack. Firms with ‘No transactions’ have high operating performance 
levels (median ROA of 29.3% and median CASH of 9.7%). Therefore, their negative 
deviation from the target leverage might be mechanical. These firms have a better operating 
performance than debt and equity issuers. Their operating performance is considerably lower, 
however, than firms that reduce equity. Debt issuers have only slightly lower median ROAs 
than firms with ‘No transactions’ (29.2%), and lower median CASH (6.1%). The opposite 
                                                 
12 We deal with the sensitivity of results to the use of regression-based targets and book leverage ratio in section 
6. 
13 tf.EarningsBeforeIntTaxesAndDepr / tf.TotalAssets. 
14 tf.CashAndSTInvestments / tf.TotalAssets.   16
holds for equity issuers. The median level of CASH (9.6%) is closer to that of firms with ‘No 
transactions’, whereas the ROA (28.5%) is less similar. 
The operating performance of firms that payout assets is very high, especially for 
those that increase dividends (60.8% median ROA and 23.0% median CASH). For share 
repurchasers, the median ROA is 38.5% and the median CASH 14.4%. This suggests that 
profitable firms increase their leverage. However, such firms have low pre-transaction debt 
levels and have accumulated substantial amounts of slack, which has possibly become too 
costly. Debt repurchasers are closer to firms with ‘No transactions’, with a median ROA of 
29.5% and a median CASH of 6.5%. Firms that simultaneously issue debt and equity are 
profitable companies (30.2% median ROA), but they have already invested part of their 
internal financing (7.1% median CASH). Firms that simultaneously payout debt and equity 
are also profitable, but have higher levels of CASH (median value of 12.4% and 8.0%, 
respectively). 
Descriptive statistics of market return (RETURN
15) differ considerably depending on 
whether firms reduce equity or issue shares. For example, firms that repurchase shares have a 
negative median return (-8.9%), while firms that increase dividends have a moderate median 
return (2.1%). In contrast, firms that issue equity (even simultaneously with debt) have a very 
high median return (36.6% and 39.3%, respectively). MTBs
16 are much closer. All firms that 
carry out equity transactions have high median MTBs (1.456 for equity issues, 1.388 for share 
repurchases, and 2.384 for dividend increases). These MTBs are large compared either to 
those of firms having no transactions (1.207), or to those of firms that carry out debt 
transactions (1.309 for debt issues and 1.149 for debt reductions). These various return 
profiles suggest that firms try to time the market by issuing equities when stock prices are 
abnormally high and by repurchasing shares when prices are abnormally low. With respect to 
variations in MTB, these may show that firms with positive NPV projects seek to avoid 
unnecessary high debt pressures by issuing equity. This explanation does not seem to hold for 
payout transactions as firms with valuable projects appear to reduce equity. Clearly, the 
significance of this result needs to be checked in a multivariate setting; such analysis is the 
main focus of section 5. 
                                                 
15 (tf.YrEndMarketCap– lagged tf.YrEndMarketCap) / lagged tf.YrEndMarketCap. 
16 (tf.YrEndMarketCap + tf.TotalLiabilities) / tf.TotalAssets.   17
Finally, we introduce two other control variables that appear in debt-equity choice 
studies. Following Hovakimian et al. (2004), we control for the size of transactions (SIZE
17) 
in external debt-equity choice regressions. Like Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Hovakimian et 




5  Results 
5.1  Target leverage ratio  
The results of event studies are reported in Table 2. The adjustment hypothesis is not 
validated for all types of external transactions. Firms do not actively change the amount of 
their equity to adjust their leverage ratio. There is some supporting evidence of adjustment, 
however, for debt transactions. 
Equity issues are not decided to offset an excess leverage, while results are 
inconclusive for debt issues. The target leverage deviation (DEV_DTAM, defined as DTAM 
minus TDTAM) does not reach a maximum prior to equity issues. Equity issuers have a track 
record of leverage lower than the target (-2.0% mean value and -3.3% median value in t-1; 
variations of leverage and of its deviations not significant over [-3, -1]). As expected, debt 
issuers are underlevered prior to the transaction (-0.9% mean value and -2.2% median value 
in t-1), and the difference becomes larger (the absolute value of the negative deviation 
increases over [-3, -1] by a mean value of 0.4% and a median value of 0.3%). In addition, 
debt issuers significantly and durably increase their leverage levels (6.5% mean value and 
5.3% median value over [-1, 3]). As a result, the post-transaction leverage ratio is 
significantly larger than the pre-transaction leverage. Although consistent with the target 
adjustment hypothesis, debt issues have a long lasting effect (in t+3, the positive deviation 
still has a mean value of 3.8% and a median value of 2.1%, in addition the deviation increases 
                                                 
17 Ratio of the net amount of the transaction divided by total assets at beginning of the year. 
18 dEPdil is equal to 1 when the cost of after-tax debt exceeds the ratio of net profits to market value of equity 
capital. Where BN/V=tf.NetIncome/tfYrEndMarketCap; the estimated cost of debt over [t-1, t] is 
tf.InterestExpenseonDebt/tf.TotalDebt and the estimated tax rate over [t-1, t] is 
tf.IncomeTaxes/(tf.NetIncome+tf.IncomeTaxes).   18
over [-1, 3] by a 5.7% mean value and a 4.8% median value), which implies low deviation 
costs as compared to adjustment costs. 
Concerning payout transactions, we reject the adjustment hypothesis for equity and 
accept it for debt. Firms that increase dividends or repurchase shares have low pre-transaction 
debt ratios
19 and the negative deviation from their target debt level increases in magnitude 
before the transaction (for share repurchases, DEV_DTAM has a -5.1% mean value and a -
6.4% median value in t-3; the absolute deviation increases by a 2.1% mean value and a 1.6% 
median value over [-3, -1]). Once again, these results highlight that adjustment costs are high 
in comparison to deviation costs. In addition, the equity payout transactions have almost no 
effect on the size of the deviation (the negative deviation in t+1 still has a 6.3% mean value 
and a 7.5% median value for share repurchases). After these equity transactions, the negative 
deviation from the target slowly diminishes (for dividend increases, the negative deviation 
falls by a 3.6% mean value and a 2.6% median value over [-1, 3]). Nevertheless, it remains 
difficult to accept the adjustment hypothesis. With regard to debt reductions, the positive 
deviation before the transaction is high (7.2% mean value and 5.5% median value in t-1). 
Debt ratios reach a peak just before debt reductions (the deviation increases by a 2.3% mean 
value and a 1.8% median value over [-3, -1]). Leverage levels are durably lower after debt 
reductions (-8.1% mean value and -8.0% median value over [-1, 3]) and the positive deviation 
is offset (the positive deviation falls by a 6.1% mean value and a 5.9% median value over [-1, 
3]). The firms are then durably close to their target (the deviation is not significant on average 
and has a -1.4% median value in t+3). 
The event study results also show the changes in the leverage ratio for firms with ‘No 
transactions’. This ratio is found to be stable over the seven-year window (i.e. changes in 
leverage are not economically significant), but firms durably maintain a negative deviation 
from the target. Assuming that targets are properly proxied by industry levels
20, this result 
shows that internal financing is a factor of negative mechanical deviation from the target. The 
downward deviation is found to be durable (it ranges from -4.2% to -3.4% in mean value, and 
from -6.0% to -5.0% in median value). 
                                                 
19 Firms that pay dividends have lower debt ratios than those that repurchase shares. For example, in t-1, the 
average debt ratio is 3.1% versus 9.2%. 
20 In the sensitivity analysis in section 6, we study whether results are different when other target proxies are 
used.   19
Overall, regressions in Table 3 have high pseudos-R
2s and classificatory ability. 
Pseudos-R
2s range from a high of 0.6706 to a low of 0.0991. Consistent with the findings in 
Hovakimian et al. (2001), the models are better suited to payout transactions than to financing 
transactions. 
The results of all ‘Transactions versus No transactions’ regressions reject the target 
adjustment hypothesis, with the exception of the ‘Debt reductions versus No transactions’ 
regression. These results are in line with the above findings. In the multivariate regression 
setting, the choice to reduce debt is positively (negatively) affected by DTAMit-1 (TDTAM). 
The reverse impact is not found for equity payouts. As highlighted by event study results, 
equity issuers are underlevered, and it is not surprising therefore that the observed signs in the 
regressions are not as expected under a tradeoff. While the event study results do not reject 
the hypothesis that adjustment is slow for debt issuers, cross-sectional regressions do as 
DTAM it-1 enters with a positive sign in the regression ‘Debt issues versus No transactions’. 
Results confirm, however, that firms try to minimize target deviations once they have decided 
to actively change their capital structure. DTAM it-1 (TDTAM) negatively (positively) affects 
the decision to issue debt rather than equity, while signs are reverse in the regressions 
pertaining to debt reductions versus either share repurchases or dividend increases. 
In summary, our results show that firms suffer little from being durably away from the 
target leverage ratio, except when they have to reduce debt because the debt ratio is too high. 
They highlight the existence of a constraining upper barrier to leverage, but adjustment 
pressures appear to be very soft when firms negatively deviate from the target leverage. Thus, 
financial distress costs and agency costs between shareholders and bondholders play an 
important role. This type of financing behavior does not reject a pecking order hypothesis that 
includes debt capacity. Nevertheless, European firms try to minimize deviations from the 
target leverage when they decide to actively change the capital structure, a result in line with 
Hovakimian (2004) for a sample of U.S. firms. These conclusions on the role of adjustment to 
the target leverage suggest that other factors significantly affect financial policies. 
 
5.2  Operating performance 
When financing transactions are considered, we observe that ROA has a positive 
impact on the probability of issuing debt rather than equity, in conformity with tradeoff 
models. ROA is insignificant in the ‘Debt issues versus Debt issues and Equity issues’ 
regression, although it has a positive impact on the probability of choosing to issue   20
simultaneously debt and equity rather than to issue equity only. It has therefore a specific 
positive impact on debt issues. Thus, debt financing has specific advantages as disciplinary 
strength and/or tax shield for profitable firms, a finding that is consistent with the tradeoff 
hypothesis. 
Our results on operating performance tell more than a simple static tradeoff story, 
however. As we can see for decisions to raise external funds, the consistently negative 
coefficients on ROA and CASH imply that firms prefer internal over external financing. 
Inclusion of simultaneous issues in the regressions reveals a specific negative impact of 
CASH on debt issues. The coefficient for CASH is negative in the ‘Debt issues versus Equity 
issues’ and ‘Debt issues and Equity issues versus Equity issues’ regressions, but not in the 
‘Debt issues versus Debt issues and Equity issues’ regression. Consequently, preference for 
internal financing over debt financing is confirmed. There is no specific impact of operating 
performance on equity issues. Slack might add enough value here to offset external financing 
aversion. As it enables to seize investment opportunities (Baskin, 1987), slack may also 
provide financing flexibility by giving managers the possibility to time the equity market. 
These results are in contrast to those in Hovakimian et al. (2004). These authors do not 
include CASH in their regressions and find a specific effect of ROA on equity issues. They 
argue that, on the one hand, unprofitable firms are likely to positively deviate from their target 
and will therefore issue equity rather than debt and, on the other hand, profitable firms do not 
offset their negative deviation as they prefer internal financing which is available. Our results 
also highlight that benefits of debt are of second-order importance for profitable firms due to 
their preference for internal financing over debt. Unlike Hovakimian et al. (2004), we do not 
observe that equity issuers operate when their profitability is low. Such a behavior would 
have been surprising because shareholders would have suffered a loss in their wealth. 
With regard to payout transactions, results for CASH and ROA are in line with 
tradeoff models. The observed signs could also be consistent with excess slack that has 
become too costly. Estimated coefficients for ROA and CASH enter with a positive sign in 
the regressions ‘Dividend increases versus No transactions’, ‘Share repurchases versus No 
transactions’ and with a negative sign in ‘Debt reductions versus Share repurchases’ and 
‘Debt reductions versus Dividend increases’. In line with tradeoff models, profitable firms try 
to raise debt levels, but the pecking order hypothesis cannot be rejected on the ground that 
profitable firms have to preserve their debt capacity. Firms that choose to reduce their equity 
are firms with low leverage ratios and with high levels of slack. They may therefore not have   21
debt capacity problems, but on the contrary they may be concerned with slack that is too 
costly. 
In the ‘Debt reductions versus No transactions’ regression, the estimated coefficient on 
ROA has a positive sign and that on CASH a negative sign. Firms that reduce debt need to 
use their internal financing for debt service. Only high profitability firms manage to repay a 
significant fraction of their debt, thus reducing the positive deviation from the target leverage. 
The negative impact of CASH can be explained by the burden of existing debt which limits 
accumulation of slack. No conclusion about specific effects can be drawn as we only observe 
a specific positive effect of ROA on dividend increases. The absence of any other impact 
could be a result of the limited size of the sub-samples. 
 
5.3  Market performance 
As far as financing transactions are concerned, we observe a dependence between 
investment and financing activities, which is consistent with the agency hypothesis. The 
estimated coefficients on RETURN and MTBit-1 have a negative sign in the ‘Debt issues 
versus Equity issues’ regression. In addition, the sum of the estimated coefficient for MTBit-1 
and for d1(MTBit-1) points to a change in sign
21 for firms with a low MTB. This is confirmed 
in regressions pertaining to simultaneous issues of debt and equity for which we observe a 
specific negative impact of MTBit-1 on equity (debt) issues for low (high) MTB firms. We 
find a negative sign for the estimated coefficients on RETURN and MTBit-1 in the ‘Debt 
issues and Equity issues versus Equity issues’ regression. Such coefficients cannot be due to a 
market timing strategy. Firms that have to choose between the above two alternatives have 
already decided to issue equity, and thus timing is irrelevant. In short, firms with mediocre 
investment projects avoid to issue equity due to lack of convergence between manager and 
shareholder interests, whereas firms with sound investment opportunities avoid to raise the 
debt level to limit the agency costs of debt. We find additionally that RETURN has a positive 
impact on equity issues in the ‘Debt issues versus Equity issues’ and ‘Debt issues versus Debt 
issues and Equity issues’ regressions. Therefore, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that 
managers implement market timing strategies. 
                                                 
21 For each change in sign between the estimated MTB it-1 coefficients and the sum of the MTBit-1 and d1(MTBit-
1) coefficients, we carry out a linear restriction test to reject the null hypothesis. It is rejected at the 5% level for 
all reported cases.   22
Similar conclusions can be drawn from payout regressions. In line with agency 
models, RETURN and MTBit-1 have a positive impact in the regressions ‘Debt reductions 
versus No transactions’, ‘Debt reductions versus Share repurchases’ and ‘Debt reductions 
versus Dividend increases’. In these regressions, we observe a change in sign for low MTB 
firms. These results suggest that firms with profitable projects are searching for financial 
flexibility by decreasing the debt burden. In a multivariate setting, the role of MTB thus 
differs from that suggested by descriptive statistics of equity payouts. We also observe a 
specific negative impact of MTBit-1 on dividend increases and share repurchases, but an 
insignificant impact of RETURN. A possible explanation is that firms lacking profitable 
projects pay out their free cash flow while maintaining debt capital for its disciplinary role. 
For debt reductions, our results show a positive impact of MTBit-1 with a change in sign for 
low MTB firms. There is no specific effect in the ‘Debt reductions and Share repurchases 
versus Share repurchases’ regression, but caution should be exercised before concluding that 
a sole timing effect is at work in payouts given the small sample size. 
 
6  Sensitivity to leverage ratio proxies 
The purpose of this section is to check whether the previous conclusions remain 
unchanged when other leverage ratio proxies are used. First, we rerun the event study tests 
and the logit regressions using book leverage
22, which is commonly used in capital structure 
studies. We also estimate target leverage using the outputs of the regressions of capital 
structure determinants as in Hovakimian et al. (2001). Following Hovakimian (2004), we use 
several more or less comprehensive sets of explanatory variables. The variables included in 
these sets are frequently used in the literature (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001). 
The first target is estimated by using the following eight variables: industry leverage ratio, 
asset tangibility ratio, logarithm of sales, depreciation and amortization to total assets ratio 
and industry means for MTB, RETURN, ROA and CASH. We add year dummy variables to 
take into account the time effect. The second target is estimated with the above mentioned 
eight variables and time dummies, but in this case MTB, RETURN, ROA and CASH are 
firm-year observations. Finally, a third target is estimated with a more restrictive specification 
that only includes industry leverage ratio, asset tangibility ratio, MTB, depreciation and 
amortization to total assets ratio and time dummy variables. All regressions are run using a 
                                                 
22 (tf.STDebtAndCurPortLTDebt + tf.TotalLTDebt) / tf.TotalAssets.   23
fixed effects panel data estimator to control for the heterogeneity among firms. Target 
estimations are truncated to lie within 0 and 1. 
Overall, conclusions concerning the event studies remain unchanged, although some 
differences in the results can be observed. In particular, when the book debt ratio is used, 
equity issuers are less underlevered prior to the transaction and the leverage ratio significantly 
increases over [-3, -1]. In spite of these results, we cannot conclude that equity issuers are 
overlevered as implied by the target adjustment hypothesis. For debt issuers, the mean 
deviation from the target is insignificant when we use book leverage in t-3, t-2 and t-1. When 
the second regression-based target is used, dividend increases and share repurchases usually 
have no effect on changes in deviations. These results do not alter our conclusion that 
leverage only has an upper barrier. 
As far as the LOGIT analysis is concerned, the target adjustment hypothesis cannot be 
rejected in a few specifications for equity issues and for share repurchases. When book 
leverage and regression-based targets are used, the expected signs are observed in the ‘Equity 
issues versus No transactions’ regression. The expected signs are also observed in the ‘Share 
repurchases versus No transactions’ regression when regression-based targets are used. But 
then, even a weak adjustment hypothesis is not confirmed for dividend increases. In short, 
these results are insufficient to accept a two-barrier adjustment hypothesis. 
Conclusions on operating performance do not appear to be in question either. We find, 
like Hovakimian et al. (2004), a positive impact of ROA in the ‘Debt issues versus Equity 
issues and Debt issues’ regression. Nevertheless, the impact is only significant at the 10% 
level when the second regression-based target estimation is used with book leverage. 
As far as market performance is concerned, coefficients on RETURN and MTBit-1 do 
not change for all financing choices, whatever proxy of leverage and target are used. For 
payout choices, some coefficients are no longer significant under some specifications, in 
particular when book leverage is used. For example, when book leverage and regression-
based targets are used, we do not observe any significant change in sign for low MTB firms in 
the ‘Debt reductions versus Share repurchases’ regression. There is no positive MTBit-1 effect 
with a change in sign for low MTB firms in the ‘Share repurchases versus No transactions’ 
regression. In both regressions, the estimated coefficient on RETURN remains positive, with 
two exceptions when market leverage is used. Then, we observe a positive impact of MTBit-1 
and a change in sign. In all cases, at least one proxy of market performance has a positive 
impact on debt reduction, supporting the hypothesis that firms with profitable projects try to 
reduce debt to maintain flexibility. With book leverage, however, we find a positive impact of   24
RETURN and a negative impact of MTBit-1 without any change in sign in the ‘Debt 
reductions versus Dividend increases’ regression. In addition, we find no impact of MTBit-1 in 
the regressions which consider simultaneously debt reductions and equity reductions, either 
through dividend increases or share repurchases. 
Note that the impact of market performance on share repurchases may not be solely 
attributed to firms repurchasing shares when stock prices are low. In this regard, when the 
first and third regression-based targets are used, as well as for all book leverage regressions, 
we observe a significant positive impact of RETURN in the ‘Debt reductions and Share 
repurchases versus Share repurchases’ regression. 
 
7  Conclusion 
In this paper, we document debt-equity choice using a sample of more than 5,000 
European firms over the period 1989-2000. We test pecking order and tradeoff models 
through time-series analysis of leverage ratios around these events and through cross-
sectional analysis of firm specific determinants of these choices. By focusing on possible 
adjustment to a target debt ratio and on the role played by operating performance and market 
performance in debt-equity choices, we provide evidence that neither of these models in their 
most commonly accepted forms offer an acceptable description of the real world. 
Significant deviations from the target leverage ratio are observed. This suggests that 
adjustment costs are high compared to deviation costs and therefore the speed of adjustment  
(if any) is slow. In addition, we show that the leverage ratio only has an upper barrier, beyond 
which it has to be actively reduced, in particular through debt reductions. This behavior of 
European firms is consistent with pecking order models that include debt capacity concerns. 
Operating performance significantly affects debt-equity choice. We find that debt has 
specific second-order benefits for profitable firms, because it is both a disciplinary tool on the 
managers and a tax shield. Nevertheless, we also observe strong preference for internal 
financing over external financing and, in particular, over debt financing, as well as a 
mechanical negative impact of operating performance on debt level. Unlike Hovakimian et al. 
(2004), we do not find that low profitability firms needing external financing tend to favor 
equity issues. Such equity financing would be detrimental to shareholders. Finally, firms that 
reduce their equity are not concerned by debt capacity problems. On the contrary, they may 
react to high levels of slack that become too costly, a behavior in line with pecking order 
models.   25
We find that managers try to take advantage of favorable market fluctuations. As in 
Hovakimian et al. (2004), our results do not restrict the impact of market performance to this 
sole timing effect. Debt-equity choices remain affected by market performance even when 
market timing is controlled for. We believe that this residual effect is rooted in agency 
conflicts and acts as a proxy for interactions between financing and investment policies. We 
confirm this assertion by introducing a linear restriction test between firms with positive NPV 
projects and other firms. When companies have profitable investment projects, a convergence 
of interests between managers and shareholders favors equity financing. In the opposite case, 
debt financing is used for its disciplinary power. For payouts transactions, firms with 
profitable projects seek flexibility through leverage reduction, while the others increase 
leverage.   26
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Table 2: Event studies 
This table contains changes in leverage ratios and deviations from target ratios over a seven year window around transactions. The data are from the Thomson Financial
® database and the sample contains 5,365 listed 
firms of member countries of the EU and EFTA which represent 20,661 firm-year observations over the period 1989-2000. DTAM is the ratio of total financial debt to total assets where the total assets is the sum of the 
book value of debt plus the market value of equity at the end of the year. DEV_DTAM is DTAM minus TDTAM. TDTAM is the DTAM of firms within the same three-digit SIC code and the same year. med is the symbol 
for median. t statistics are reported for mean deviations and variations. Ranking tests are reported for median deviations and variations. ***indicates significance at the 1% level.**indicates significance at the 5% 
level. *indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 
   t-3  t-2  t-1  t0  t1  t2  t3  [-3,-1]  [-1,1]  [-1,3] 
   mean  med  mean  med  mean  med  mean  med  mean  med  mean  med  mean  med  mean  med  mean  med  mean  med 
Equity issues                                       
DTAM  0.152  0.124  0.151  0.122  0.151  0.118  0.134  0.100  0.149  0.114  0.160  0.125  0.168  0.134  0.006  0.000  0.000  -0.002  0.009  -0.001 
DEV_DTAM  -0.021***  -0.031***  -0.020***  -0.035***  -0.020***  -0.033***  -0.037***  -0.057***  -0.030***  -0.048***  -0.017***  -0.035***  -0.009  -0.036***  0.006  0.005  -0.006  -0.007  0.012**  0.009** 
N  396  458  645  645  519  452  394  396  519  394 
Debt issues                                       
DTAM  0.170  0.142  0.168  0.141  0.172  0.144  0.247  0.222  0.244  0.219  0.236  0.213  0.231  0.207  0.000  -0.001  0.078***  0.066***  0.065***  0.053*** 
DEV_DTAM  -0.008***  -0.019***  -0.012***  -0.023***  -0.009***  -0.022***  0.053***  0.036***  0.045***  0.028***  0.039***  0.023***  0.038***  0.021***  -0.004***  -0.003***  0.060***  0.050***  0.057***  0.048*** 
N  3684  4400  5547  5547  4000  3106  2507  3684  4000  2507 
Dividend increases                                     
DTAM  0.042  0.007  0.040  0.006  0.031  0.003  0.033  0.003  0.046  0.006  0.049  0.007  0.053  0.008  -0.011***  0.000***  0.016***  0.000***  0.028***  0.000*** 
DEV_DTAM  -0.106***  -0.109***  -0.107***  -0.114***  -0.115***  -0.117***  -0.114***  -0.115***  -0.099***  -0.110***  -0.091***  -0.101***  -0.085***  -0.099***  -0.009***  0.000*  0.014***  0.009***  0.036***  0.026*** 
N  377  448  538  538  435  334  263  377  435  263 
Share repurchases                                       
DTAM  0.108  0.079  0.101  0.079  0.092  0.055  0.103  0.071  0.102  0.061  0.114  0.092  0.135  0.120  -0.015**  -0.006***  0.017***  0.000**  0.075***  0.033*** 
DEV_DTAM  -0.051***  -0.064***  -0.056***  -0.075***  -0.072***  -0.088***  -0.064***  -0.078***  -0.063***  -0.075***  -0.042***  -0.060***  -0.028  -0.054*  -0.021***  -0.016***  0.012*  0.012*  0.062***  0.035*** 
N  82  91  99  99  69  43  30  82  69  30 
Debt reductions                                       
DTAM  0.237  0.209  0.250  0.224  0.273  0.246  0.202  0.172  0.188  0.155  0.186  0.158  0.188  0.158  0.030***  0.025***  -0.076***  -0.074***  -0.081***  -0.080*** 
DEV_DTAM  0.042***  0.022***  0.052***  0.030***  0.072***  0.055***  0.010***  -0.006  -0.002  -0.016***  -0.001  -0.018***  0.003  -0.014**  0.023***  0.018***  -0.066***  -0.062***  -0.061***  -0.059*** 
N  2273    2638    3394    3394    2611    2219    1871    2273    2611    1871   
No transactions                                       
DTAM  0.140  0.105  0.131  0.097  0.138  0.100  0.137  0.097  0.137  0.100  0.139  0.103  0.138  0.103  -0.007  -0.003  0.003***  0.000  0.002  -0.001 
DEV_DTAM  -0.034***  -0.050***  -0.042***  -0.059***  -0.035***  -0.056***  -0.038***  -0.060***  -0.039***  -0.058***  -0.036***  -0.053***  -0.035***  -0.051***  -0.008***  -0.006***  0.001  0.000  0.006***  0.004*** 
N  6660  7297  9619  9619  7751  6589  5526  6660  7751  5526 
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Table 3: LOGIT regressions 
This table contains the results using the LOGIT estimator for debt-equity choice regressions. The data are from the Thomson Financial
® database. The sample contains 5,365 listed firms of 
member countries of the EU and EFTA which represent 20,661 firm-year observations over the period 1989-2000. DTAM is the ratio of total financial debt to total assets where total assets is 
the sum of the book value of debt plus the market value of equity at the end of the year. TDTAM is the DTAM of firms within the same three-digit SIC code and the same year. ROA is the ratio of 
EBITDA to total book assets measured over the period [t-1, t]. CASH is the mean value over [t-1, t] of the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total book assets. RETURN is the ratio of the 
annual change in the market value of equity to the market value of equity at the beginning of the year. MTBit-1 is the ratio of the market value of assets (book value of assets plus market value of 
equity less book value of equity) to the book value of assets at the beginning of the year. d1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms with a MTBit-1 lower than one. dEPdil is a dummy variable to 
proxy for the dilution effect of equity transactions. It is equal to 1 when the after-tax cost of  debt exceeds the ratio of net profits to market value of equity. SIZE is the ratio of the amount of the 
transaction to total book assets. Estimated coefficients for the country and year dummy variables are not reported. Standard deviations are reported in italics. *** indicates significance at the 
1% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. * indicates significance at the 10% level. t1 is a t-statistic for the linear restriction test under the null hypothesis. Wald 1 is a test of the joint 
significance of time dummy variables. Wald 2 is a test of the joint significance of the country dummy variables. Wald 1 and 2 are asymptotically distributed as χ
2 under the null hypothesis of no 
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DTAMit-1 -2.008 -1.489 -0.009 2.998 1.188 18.428 26.955 13.236 14.934 11.625 12.781 -1.319 -6.320 7.724
0.439*** 0.463*** 0.622 0.416*** 0.167*** 2.080*** 1.761*** 2.592*** 3.076*** 2.771*** 4.729*** 1.215 1.044*** 0.208***
TDTAM 3.127 1.706 1.578 0.077 3.230 -6.856 -3.050 -4.683 -4.948 -1.967 -9.367 2.062 0.668 -2.399
0.759*** 0.768** 1.064 0.746 0.297*** 1.988*** 1.392** 2.445* 3.640 3.135 7.515 1.809 0.985 0.371***
ROA 1.230 0.437 1.112 -2.383 -1.299 -2.441 -4.519 -4.699 -0.483 -1.138 -4.897 4.166 6.181 0.936
0.269*** 0.327 0.345*** 0.258*** 0.134*** 0.758*** 0.456*** 0.780*** 1.180 1.100 2.904* 0.717*** 0.320*** 0.157***
CASH -2.456 -0.491 -3.138 -1.009 -3.831 -4.443 -4.748 0.785 -2.576 -8.859 -5.566 2.098 2.689 -1.086
0.418*** 0.529 0.685*** 0.403** 0.201*** 1.044*** 0.667*** 1.702 1.818 1.933*** 3.178* 0.717*** 0.352*** 0.230***
RETURN -1.033 -0.769 -0.234 1.553 0.313 1.398 0.617 0.151 0.049 0.558 1.698 -1.438 -0.566 0.120
0.081*** 0.086*** 0.116** 0.084*** 0.042*** 0.367*** 0.191*** 0.381 0.423 0.474 1.101 0.331*** 0.132*** 0.052**
MTBit-1 -0.211 0.015 -0.321 0.483 0.369 0.431 0.182 0.275 1.350 0.324 0.126 -0.077 0.023 0.155
0.040*** 0.048 0.058*** 0.039*** 0.027*** 0.116*** 0.059*** 0.094*** 0.546** 0.174* 0.549 0.107 0.042 0.031***
d1(MTBit-1) 0.815 0.963 -0.058 -1.693 -0.777 -1.611 -0.792 0.190 -0.588 -2.787 -0.740 0.535 -0.302 -0.594
0.183*** 0.199*** 0.259 0.181*** 0.059*** 0.405*** 0.385** 0.976 0.665 1.358** 1.028 0.344 0.281 0.068***
dEPdil 0.834 0.463 0.508 -0.132 0.640 -0.192 -0.016 -0.375 -0.361 1.372 -0.047 0.110 -0.056 -0.041
0.103*** 0.108*** 0.142*** 0.101 0.040*** 0.282 0.193 0.392 0.465 0.493*** 0.799 0.231 0.127 0.049
SIZE -1.148 -5.155 4.314 -6.538 1.570 -14.914 -18.232 18.582 17.000
0.215*** 0.222*** 0.337*** 2.379*** 1.535 2.262*** 2.674*** 2.919*** 4.763***
N1 5547 5547 740 645 5547 3394 3394 3394 3394 51 28 99 538 3394
N2 645 740 645 9619 9619 99 538 51 28 538 99 9619 9619 9619
t1 51.1 259.1 443.4 33.9 14.5 7.7 118.4
Wald 1 120.7(11) 43.7(11) 26.4(11) 88.4(11) 155.1(11) 39.2(11) 34.8(11) 16.8(11) 10.3(7) 17.0(11) 4.1(7) 47.8(11) 51.0(11) 49.8(11)
Wald 2 124.9(14) 157.6(15) 21.31(14) 188.0(14) 237.0(16) 31.1(10) 33.0(14) 15.1(8) 16.8(4) 8.2(8) 0.5(4) 33.27 (10) 98.9(14) 218.8(16)
Pseudo-R
2
0.2099 0.3413 0.2269 0.2079 0.0991 0.4331 0.6705 0.4376 0.3519 0.5047 0.4342 0.1987 0.3670 0.1660
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